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4
ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION: A STUDY
OF DOMESTIC INFLUENCE IN THE EUROPEAN
UNION FROM

1989-1993

Jason Grishkoff
Economic and m onetary union ill Europe was by no means a new idea. Following
the increased economic division in Europe after World War J, calls had bee n made for a
common European currency as early as 1929. However, not until the Suez crisis of 1950,
~hen France's policy was reoriented towards an economic partnership with Germany, was
the trend towards econo mic union set in motion. 1 Shortly after the crisis, the Rome Treaty
of 1958 officially established the European Economic Conullunity (EEC). While this treaty
did not initially comprise monetary integration, the issue came up in the early 1960s, never
to disappea r.
By 1968, the six founding Member States of the EEC had achieved most of the goals
laid down in the Rome Treaty, most im.portantly the establishment of a successful customs
union. The economies of the Member States had become well integrated , conducting about
half of their trade amongst thenlselves. Policymakers in France suggested that because their
successes in areas such as the Common Agricultural Policy were largely dependent on stable
exchange rates, the Community should "be endowed with a common international
monetary policy."2 One of the best ways to accomplish tllls, they argued, was to create an
economic and monetary union.
This article assesses the influence that political parties and the public had over the
European policy choices made by the elite representatives participating in the development
of Economic and Monetary Union from 1989 to 1993. It demonstrates that
Intergovenullentalism and Supranationalism are not, in and of themselves , capable of
explaining European integration. Rather, it asserts that the Fusion theory, which combines
elements of both Supranationalism and Intergovenm1entalism , offers a more appropriate
explanation of EU politics. More significantly, it shows that European executives have
become more acco untabl e for their European policies, and that national pressures are
capable of indirectly influencing decisions made at th e European level. It concludes,
however, by confirnllng that the 'democratic deficit' remains a very real issue, parti cularl y
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where the link between national politics and EU level politics is concerned.
THEORIES OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND EU POLITICS

For many years, European scho lars attenlpted to create gra nd theories for the sake of
comparing the new E U political system to that of government, politics, and policy-making
in all political systems. Over the yea rs, these grand theories have b een replaced by "mid-level
explanations of cross-systematic po litical processes [that act as] the intellectual prec urso rs of
any theory of EU politics."] One of these gra nd theories, N eofunctionalisl11 , was first
suggested by Ernst Haas in 1958. The basic claim of N eofunctio nalism is that "a given
action, related to a specific goal, creates a situatio n in which the origi nal goal can be assured
only by taking furth er actions, which in turn create a further condition and a need for m o re,
and so forth."4 A ccording to this argument, the forces behind this spillover process are nonstate ac tors, such as business associations, trade uni o ns, and political parties, promo ting their
economic and ideological interests. H owever, N eofun ctio nalism failed to acco unt for the
slowing dow n of E uropean integratio n in the 1960s, and the strengthening of the
intergovernmental elements of the E uropean Conll1l1nity (EC). N ew theories had to be
developed .
(Liberal) IntClgovCfmf/ cn talisl'I1. D erived from the realist school of international relations,
Intergovernmentalism argues that European integration is driven by the interests and actions
of the E uropean nation states with the aim of p rotecting their geopolitical interests, such as
national security and sovereignty. Intergovernmentalist theory draws on general theories of
b argaining and negotiation to view the EU as a forum in which interstate bargaining
o utcom es are decisively shaped by the relative power of nation-states. This relative power
among states is arguably shaped by asymmetrical interdependence. In this model,
governm ents that stand to benefit the most from an agreem ent relative to their alternatives
tend to offer g reater compromises. 5 This pursuit of national self-interest, strategic rationality,
and policy outcomes dependent on relative power, can attribute for the continued
cooperation between states within the E U bargaining arena. In this model, policymaking is
seen as taking the shape of a " unidirectio nal causal chain beginning with the preferences of
societal actors and p owerful constituencies and translated through the state to the natio nal
interests and positions w hich are then represented in Brussels negotiations."6
Liberal-Intergovernmentalis11l, first argued for by M oravcsik, divides the EU decision
making process into two stages: in the first there is a demand for EU policies from dom estic
econo mic and social actors; in the second sta ge EU p oli cies are supplied by
intergovernmental bargains, such as treaty refo rms. As in classic Intergovernmentalism,
M ember States are still treated as unitary actors and the supranational institutions of the EU
have a limited impact o n final o utcom es. Liberal-Intergove rrunentalism differs in that it
argues state preferences are driven by economic rather than geopolitical interests, that state
preferences are not fixed, and that states ' preferences va ry from issue to issue. 7
While Intergovernmentalist theories present a plausible explana tion for the m an ner in
which M ember States come to decide o n and adopt conlllon European policies, they face
a number of criticisms. In particular, these criticism s are aimed at their accounts of
preference formati on and their understanding of decision making in the council. It has b een
argued that Intergovernmentalism fails to account for negotiation, bargaining, or conflict
between ministries, ministers, and/or officials, each with their own constituencies and
clienteles. 8 C ritics point out that the state executives are pressured by the policy initiatives
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of the supranatio nal E uro pean Commissio n (EC) , and influenced by the anticipated
reactions and possible positio ns of o ther internation al actors. 9 T hose same critics, naturall y,
have proposed their own theories about the way in w hich Europe is Europeanizing.
Supral1ationaiisl'Il. Some theorists attempt to account for criticism s of
Intergovernmentalisrn by arguing for a Supranatio nal interpretation of the EU. They view
the EU as a complex institutional and policy envi ro nment, with multiple and ever changing
interests and actors, as well as limited info nnation about the lo ng- term implications of treaty
reforms o r day-to- day legislative o r executive decisions. T h ey claim that th e Member State
govermnents are no t in full control , and that the sup ra national institutio ns exert significant
independent influence o n instituti o nal policy outcomes . This conceptualization argues that
" the E U [is] a network in w hich individual m ember states are increasingly defined no t by
themselves but in relatio n to their EU partners, and in which they prefer to interact with
o ne another rather than third parties because those interacti o ns create incenti ves for selfinterested cooperatio n ." I 0
In this model , M ember States have realized that there is m o re to gain by working
within the system than by going at it by themselves. l ! T he increased administrative
interaction b etween national officials has arguably brought abo ut a fu sio n of m ember state
bureaucracies. Consequ entl y, civil servants n o longer act as 'guard dogs' of national interests
when considering EU po licy. Instead , they see Bru ssels as an arena in w hich routine
decisio ns are taken and the offi cials of o ther Member States are partners. 12
H owever, M oravcsik contends that the entrepreneurship of supranational officials
tends to be futil e and redundant, as "gove rnments generally find it easy to act as their own
entrepreneurs and to impose distributional bargains through the use of traditional
nonmilitar y instruments of power p olitics ... The distributive outcomes of negotiations have
refl ected not the preferences of supranational acto rs but the pattern of asymmetrical
interdependen ce among po licy preferences." 13 O ther critics assert that the creation and
evolution of tlus supranatio nal institutio n as a step in the direction of a type of E urofederalism .
Fusion Theory. B y approaching E uropeanization in terms of the problems which it
p oses and the opportUluties it creates for domestic political managem ent, theorists have been
able to reconcile the differences b etween national adaptation and national convergence,
providing a fram ework in which both Intergovernmentalism and Supranationalism can
coexist. 14 The governments of Member states "must find the m eans to reconcile potentiall y
contradicto ry E uro pean and do mestic pressures, as regards b o th substantive policy choices
and broader discourses of leg itimation ." 15 In certain circumstances, particular M ember
States nuy be faced with having to implement policy choices that enjoy little domestic
suppo rt. However, these M ember States may also find that the opportunity structures of
policy-m aking in the E U have b een changed in a manner which lllay be positively utilized
by national governments. 16 R o bert Putnam's 'two-level games' model views European
bargaining as under a do uble constraint: natio nal governments must make policy decisions
that are acceptable b o th domestically and internatio nalIy.17 As such , it is possible fo r
Member States to use do m estic opposition as leverage for bargaining in European
negotiations.
Along this sam e vein of thinking, M aurer and Wessels have posited a fusion theory
that helps to identify interrelated processes of Europeanization between M ember States and
E U institutions, and national and European adnunistrative system s. They argue that
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[bo th] levels of interactio n (Council Secretariat and permanent representatio ns
at the EU level and m ember state institutio ns and representatives from the
national level) mee t in a range of committee structures that co-ordinate the
views and opinions of m ember state and EC / EU administrations on a given set
of issu es. Fusion theor y wo uld then expect that these arenas would act neither
as the 'guard dogs' of natio nal governments charged with controlling the
E uropean Commissio n nor as forums fo r exclusively intergovernmental
bargaining. 18
T lus theo ry has mu ch in commo n with the view of E uro pealuza tio n as problem and
o ppo rtunity for do mestic political managem ent: both see natio nal representatives to the E U
as having to balance the interests of domestic and internatio nal pressures witho ut putting
too heavy an emphasis o n either. Whil e areas such as the Conmuttee fo r Home and Judicial
Affairs or the C FSP cOlllnuttee are perhaps m ore representative of intergovernmental
bargailung theory, I argue that the decision-making process of Econonuc and M o netary
Union falls in line with Fu sio n T heory.
THE DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT

C ritics of the lack of dem ocratic legitimacy in the EU po int to the mode of political
representatio n and the nature of policy outputs. They argue that E uropean integ ratio n has
reduced the representatio nal qualities of Europea n dem ocracies by concentrating an
increasing amount of decisions in w hat is an exec utive d ominated political system . 19 , :W
Actions taken at this E uropean executive level are arguably beyo nd the control of national
parliaments, as they " are much m o re isolated from natio nal parliam entary scrutiny and
control than are national cabinet nunisters or bureau crats in the dOlnestic policy-making
p rocess. As a result, goven m l ents can effectively igno re their parliam ents when m aking
decisions in Brussels."2 1 A notable response to this claim has com e from Andrew M o ravcsik ,
who argues that the European Union has in fact made Executives m o re accountable to their
citizens. He notes that the actio ns of government ministers are no longer scrutinized simply
at hom e, but in a wider E uropean context, and that nunisters at hom e are no lo nger held
to account solely fo r their dom esti c record, but also for their actions in Brussels. 22
T he EP is the only branch of the EU that is directl y elected. Though stronge r than it
o nce was, critics still claim that it is weak compared to the gove rnments in the C o uncil. 23 .
24, 25 Furthermore, neither natio nal elections nor EP electio ns are 'Euro pean' electio ns: they
are fought on domestic ra ther than European issues, and parties collude to keep the issue of
Europe off the domestic age nda .26. 27 The consequ ences are that EU citizens' preferences
"on issues on the EU policy agenda at best have only an indirect influence on EU policy
o utcomes."28 Contrary to this, Moravcsik emphasizes the fact that the EP now has vetopower over the selectio n of the Commission, and that legislatio n requires a majoriry support
in b oth the Council and the E p 2lJ
Further claims of dem ocratic deficit show that the Euro pean Union is either too far
rem oved trom electoral controls, o r too complex for citizens of the member states to
understand and fo rm reasoned o pinio ns about. 30 In additio n to the complexiry o f the
process it is also argued that EU policies are overly technical and discourage citizens trom
engaging with the process. O n top of all this, theorists argue that the system lacks
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transparency. According to these arguments, the end result is that the EU has alienated
European citizens with serious repercussions for both the traditional democratic ideal of a
citizenry educated in the governmental process, and the ideal of government actors
accountable to the general public. Moravcsik counters this argument by claiming that the
EU policy-making pro cess is more transparent than most domestic systems of
governrnent. 31
Lastly and usually in accordance with some or all of the above arguments, various
critics claim that the policies decided upon at the European level are not representative of
the . preferences of European voters. Critics argue that "governments are able to undertake
policies at the European level that they cannot pursu e at the domestic level , where they are
constrained by parliaments, courts and corporatist interest group structures."32 Moravcsik
counters that the EU's elaborate system of checks-and-balances ensures that an
overwhelming consensus is required for any policies to be agreed. H e asserts that EU
policies are the result of a compromise between all interest parties, from all Members States
and all the main party oppositions. Only those on the extremes are excluded. 33
Conversely, Majone argues that the EU is essentially a 'regulatory state,' by which
Pareto-eHicient outcomes (where some benefit and no one is nude worse of}) are the
result. 34 , 35 He asserts that EU policy- making should not be 'democratic' in the usual
m eaning of the term because an EU dominated by the EP or directly elected institutions
would lead to a politicization of regulatory policy-making. This politicization would result
in redistributive rather than Pareto-efficient outcomes, and thus undermine the legitim.acy
of the EU.36, 37, 38 Rather than make fundamental changes, he asse rts that the EU should
instead implement more transparent decision-making. Similarly, Moravcsik makes three
daims to support isolation of the EU policy-making process. First, he asserts that "universal
involvement in government policy is beyond the scope of any modern citizen."39 Secondly,
isolating quasi-judicial decisions is essential to the protection of minority interests and the
aversion of a tyranny of the majority. Third, isolated policy-makers can correct for a bias
inherent in majoritarian contests. In this view, then, "the EU ITlay be more 'representative'
precisely because it is, in a narrow sense, less 'democratic' ."40
INTERPRETING THE RESULTS

The following section provides a brief outline of six case studies discussed at greater
length in the original Honors Thesis submitted to the UCSD Department of Political
Science.
Case1: Thatcher's eviction. Because Thatcher (EDV1) was not responsive to public
opinion or political parties, partisan pressures in Parliament forced her to resign. How were
political parties, particularly the Conservative party, able to remove her from power,
effectively changing the United Kingdom's stance on EMU?
According to Howe, Thatcher's demise came about as a result of "the poll tax, her
mounting unpopularity on the doorstep, [and] personal dismay at her whole 'style of
governnlent'; all these came ahead of concern about her attitude towards Europe."41
Discontent with Thatcher's policy was first voiced by the public in the 1989 EP elections,
when the Labour Party enjoyed its first victory since the Conservative rise to power in
1979. Yet Thatcher remained unresponsive to growing pro-European sentiment in the
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United Kingdom, continuing her isolationist policy.
The British government's parliamentary system requires that the Prime Minister have
the suppo rt of the maj o rity in the House of COl1lllOl1S. As T hatcher's policy decisio ns
continu ed to increase tensions within her Conservati ve Party, her grip o n the m aj o ri ty
began to slip. The final blow cam e when a leading Conservative figure, Geoffrey H owe, gave
his resignation speech , in w hi ch he claimed her isolatio nist approach to EMU wo uld have
'g rave' ramifications fo r E ngland. 42 With the passing of a vote of no confidence, the
m embers of Parliam ent we re able to renlOve Thatcher from power. Thus government
structure provided political parties (IV2) with an effective m eans by which they could exert
pressure o n and eventually rernove T hatcher. While the public had not played an immediate
part in this vote of no con fidence, their outspoken discontent with T hatcher's dom estic
policy added further legitimacy to the Conservative Party's decisio n. H ad Conserva ti ve
voters w ithin the public suppo rted Thatcher's dom estic policy, m embers within the
Conserva tive Party wo uld likely have been constrained by their constitu ents from passing a
vote of no confidence.
Therefore, I conclude that broad discontent within bo th the public (IVI ) and political
parties (IV2) for T hatch er's domestic and European policy decisio ns (EDV1) provided the
impetus for the Conservative Party to use a vote of n o confidence to efltx tively rem ove her
from pow er. Thus, by ho lding Thatch er responsible, the British parliament demonstrates that
represe ntative elites to the E U can be held accountable by natio nal legislative bodies.
Casc:?: M ajor oufmancuI'crs over public and party. Jo hn Maj o r was able to use public
opinio n (IV1 ) to ratify M aastricht in the face oppositio n fro m within the then m aj o ri ty
Conservative Party (IV2). H ow was this possible w hen n either the public, nor the m aj ority
Conservative Party approved of Maastricht?
I argue that the answer can be found in the fact that bo th the public and Party
approved of Major's do m estic policies . One month before T hatcher's resignation , o pinio n
polls showed Labour 16% ah ead of the C o nservatives .43 Yet in the 1992 elections, M aj or
reversed the situatio n , bringing the Conservative Party a 7 .5% margin of victory over
Labo ur. This shift dem o n strates that where Thatcher lacked the suppo rt of public opinion ,
M aj or enjoyed it.
When Conservative R ebels (IV2) attempted to j oin Labo ur in rej ecting the
ratification of M aastricht in Parliam ent, Major was able to appeal to the partisan loyalty of
their constituents, fo rcing them to vote in line w ith their Conserva tive Party, and thus
approve the Treaty. 44 Even tho ugh neither public opinio n no r political parties suppo rted
M ajor's European policy, approval of his domestic p olicy was such that he was able to
m aintain their overall suppo rt, and thus did not have to change his EMU policy decisions.
Therefo re, one can argu e that the preferences of domestic acto rs we re not represented by
M aj o r, giving credence to the argument of a democratic deficit.
Mitterrand 's N ear Catastrophe. As President of France during the development of EMU
policy and M aastricht ratificatio n, Mitterrand's European policy (FDV1) was supported by
public opinion (IV1) , as evide nced through the high levels of stable suppo rt fo r EU
unificatio n and COlTl1no n currency up to ratificatio n . Furthermo re, Mitterrand's European
policy was not challenged by the Parties (IV2) that m ade up the natio nal assembly o r senate.
H owever, Mitterrand's failure to use direct consultatio n almost resulted in the rej ectio n of
his E uropean policy.
This case is interesting in that we see a drastic and negative change in the European
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policy preference of the public. To determine why, it is important that we look into the
factors that m ade 48.95% of the population the vote 'no'. According to Mazzucelli , "57%
voted ' no' because of the loss of French sovereignty implied . . . 55% voted ' no' in o rder not
to leave E uro pe in the hands of Brussels technocrats. Another 40% voted ' no ' out of fear of
German dorninance. M ost significantly, 3 1% voted 'no' to reject the entire French political
establishment."45 As can be seen, m ost of th ose who voted 'no ' did so to dem o nstrate
dissatisfacti o n with Mitterrand's Europea n policy: his willingness to give away France's
sovereignty and put it in the hands of B russels technocrats. T his growing dissatisfaction was
further delllo nstr.lted in the disaster of the 1992 regio nal electio ns and the catastrophic
defeat of the Left in the 1993 legislative election , when the Socialist Party obtained its worst
electoral result since the 1960s. Thus, we see a dip in bo th European policy approval and
domestic policy approval. While the majority the public and those in parties approved of
Mitterrand's decisions, it ca n be said that the growing discontent amongs t the public
presented a ve ry real possibility of change.
Case 4: Kohl Plays the W.l iting Game. As C hancello r of Ge rmany, Helmut Ko hl's
European policy (GDV1) was constrained by the public (IV1 ) in the 1989 German EP
electio ns. While the vote demonstrated that the maj ority of the public approved of Kohl's
domestic and European policies, the sm all proportion that voted for the Republicans was
influ ential enough to threaten the m aj ority hold of Kohl's CDU/ CSU Party in the
Bundestag. Because the Republican Party ran almost entirel y on an anti- EC platfo rm , o ne
can assume that those who voted for them were expressing discontent with Kohl's European
policy.The results constrained Kohl from pushing ahead with further decisio n- making, as he
was worried that provokin g a debate on E MU would furth er tarnish his already suffering
public reputatio n.
Ko hl's weariness paid off, when, in the D ecember 1990 unificati o n electio ns, the
public voted to reelect him, thus allowing him to act auto nomously when making European
decisions. T he focus of tlus election was principally German unification; European issues
were hardly mentioned. While this is a comparatively weak case in demonstrating the
influ ence of the public over a DV (as they did not change his decisions, but m erely m ade him
wait to act), it demonstrates the impo rtance of approval of domestic policies as a
deternunant factor.
Case5: Kohl trumps public disapproval. C hancellor Kohl (GDV1) was able to assert the
decisions made on EMU in Maastricht n egotiations with overwhelnung support from
parties in the Bundestag and Bundesrat. While the public was presented a channel for
challenging the decisio ns m ade by Kohl through Constitutional Court, they were unable to
legitinuze their anti-EMU stance.
T his case differs from the previous cases in that public opiluon seem s to have had little
direct bearing on the o utcom e. The German Bundestag and Bundesrat overwhelnungly
supported Kohl's EMU policy decisions. The fact that Ko hl required approval from the main
legislative bodies of the Germ.an government provides evidence that counters the
democratic deficit claim that elite representatives to the EU are b eyond the control of
national parliaments. The support of the B undestag and Bundesrat also allowed the Kohl
government to avoid direct public consultation.
With no election o n the horizon, Kohl 's government would not have been overly
concerned about any potential dip in their approval rating. Further quelling these fears was
the fact that the public at the time approved of Kohl's dom estic policies. Because electio ns
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are primarily focused o n do m estic issues, a contrary E uropean policy would not necessarily
threate n Kohl 's hold on power. T hus, even though the public did no t agree with Ko hl and
the parties in regdrds to European policy, their support of his party's do mestic policy was
such that there was no fea r abo ut disagreeing with them .
Case 6: Danish r~feren dum rejects Maastrich t. Danish Prime Minister Schluter (DkDV 1)
was made to change decisio ns o n EM U in M aastricht negotiatio ns b ecause political parties
(IV2) prevented him ti-om securing the five- sixths maj o rity in Parliament needed to avoid
a referendum, and because the subsequent public referendum (IV1) o n Maastricht narrowl y
fa iled.
In D enmark 's Parliame nt, a bill must achieve a fi ve-sixths m aj o ri ty to approve the
delega tio n of natio nal powers to international authoriti es witho ut a referendum . B ut
beca use tllis m 'Uo rity was no t reached, the decision was put directl y into the hands of the
public by m eans of a referendum. T he fact that the D anish Folketing was able to rej ect the
decisio ns of Schli.iter provides evidence contrary to the dem ocrati c deficit argument that
representative elites to the EU are not h eld acco untable fo r their actions by natio nal
parliam ents. When the referendum rolled around, the public voted to rej ect ratificatio n of
M aas tricht. The reaso n fo r the Danish 'no ' was m ainl y related to E uro p ean
ConU1ll1nity / European Unio n issues, and not dissatisfaction with their leaders or for ulterio r
motives. 46 Therefore, it can be said that regardless of whether the public approved of
dom estic policy, they j oined the parties in disapproving of E uropean policy. The combined
disapproval of these two allowed them to change the DV appropriately.
D elle/oping a Theory. T he results of the study dem o nstrate that if public opinio n (IV1 )
and political parties (IV2) are aligned, and there is disapproval of the (Europea n policy
decisio ns/ stances ot) DV, then the DV w ill change (Case 1, Case 4, Case 6). Conve rsely,
w here public opinion (IV1) and political parties (IV2) are aligned , and there is approval of
(Eu rop ean policy decisions/stan ces o t) DV, then DV will rem ain unchanged (Case 3). It was
also demonstrated that where public opinion (IVI) and political parties (IV2) are unaligned ,
the approval of the domestic policies of policymakers becorn es an important facto r. Because
politicians are strategic acto rs, they must ride party or public o pinio n. Thus, if the public and
parties are not aligned over E uropean policy but do both approve of domestic policy, elite
policym akers can assert their E uropean policy witho ut fear of losing any impendi ng
electio ns o r the confidence of their party (Case 2, 5). Conversely, if there is disapproval of
do m estic policies from either, the DV will be forced to change. For further discussio n , see
complete Thesis.
IMPLICATIONS

The goal of this study was to assess the influ en ce that the public and political parties
have over the European policy choices m ade by their elite represen ta tives to the Europ ean
Unio n. Research was narrowed to the impact tha t public opinion and political parties
within France, England, Germany, and Denmark had on elite policynukers participating in
the supranational development of Econonlic and M o netary Union (EMU) .
This study shows that there exist elem ents of dem ocratic connection under certain
conditio ns, w hereby elites participating in EU policymaking are respo nsive to what political
parties and the public w ithin their M ember State advocate. While in some regards this
reailinns standard views of the E uropean political system , it also serves to add additio nal
complexities to the debate. T he following pages address som e of these implicatio ns.
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bnplications Jar Theories Ilf European Integration and Politics. In its simplest fo rm,
Intergovernmentalism asserts that European integration is driven by the interest and actions
of elites in European Member States, who act to protect their geopolitical interests, such as
national security and sovereignty. These geopolitical interests are arguably shaped by the
preferen ces of societal actors , such as parties and the public. Liberal-Intergovernmentalism,
a more updated theory p osited by Moravcsik, m aintains that econom.ic, rather than
geopolitical interests, are the driving forces behind the decisions made by these
representatives. 47 The results of tills study show that the impetus for EMU was provided by
both geopolitically and economically-driven elites from within Member States, particularly
France and Germany. It further shows that in many cases, these elites were constrained by,
and acted in accordallce with, the interests of societal actors. However, the fact that the
guidelines for EMU policy were supplied by the supranational Delors Report. rather than
by national actors m aking intergovernmental bargains, lends support to Sa ndholtz's
counterargument, namely that state executives are pressured by the po licy initiatives of the
supranational European Commission (EC).48 Furthermore, we also see that in many of
these cases the preferen ces of societal actors did not, and often could no t influence the
preferen ces of elite policym.akers . The results of this study thus imply that the
Intergoverl1l11entalist bottom- up approach to EU integration cannot, on its own, provide an
adequate explanation for the relatio nship between domestic actors and representative elites.
The essential claim of Supranationalisll1 is that M ember States are not in fi.llI control.
Rather, it is the supranational EU institutions that exert significant independent influence
on institutional policy outcomes. The domestic implications of this theo ry are that the
bureaucracies of Member States have become fused together, and most pertinent to this
study, that there has b een a dilution of natio nal preferences in tavor of European
partnersillp.49 While the tact that the Delors Committee set the guidelines tor EMU does
support this theory, this study reaffirms Moravcsik's contention that it is not necessaril y the
European institutions that always set the tempo for integrationist policy. A glaring example
of this was made by Denmark's first Maastricht referendum, whereby national actors were
able to counter EMU guidelines, providing, and ultimately implem enting their own
exceptions to the Treaty. Similarly, the claim that there has b een a dilution of national
interests is countered by the fact that, in some cases, domestic actors were able to assert their
national preferences and constrain or change the decisions that their natio nal elites made
when negotiating in the EU. Therefore, it can be argued that Supranationalisl1l does not
provide an adequate explanation of the interaction between domestic actors and national
elites, or of that between elites and the institutions of the ED.
Fusion Theory claims that governments of Member States must find the means to
reconcile potentially contradictory European and domestic pressures. 50 Essentially, there
persists a ' two-level ' constraint by which national gover nments must lIlake policy decisions
that are acceptable both domestically and internationally. 51 Thus, rather than attempt to
explain European politics as either solely Supranationalist or Intergoverl1l11entalist, Fusion
Theory reconciles the two, viewing elites as ac tors stuck in the middle: they must act in the
interest of national preferences, willIe at the sanle time attempting to account for the
pressures placed on them by European institutions. While it is possible to contend that
Thatcher did not attempt to resolve her European policies with either EU or domestic
pressures, the fact that tills contributed to her downfall as Prime Minister lends credence to
the argument that successful governments must reconcile the two if they wish to contribute
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to EU policies. Thus, the results of this study do not provide evidence contrary to this
theory. Rather, they reaffirm that indeed, both supranational and national pressures playa
vital role in determining the policy outcomes of EU negotiation .
il11plicatiol15 for th e Democratic Deficit. One of the primary arguments for the lack of
dernocratic legitimacy in the EU is that European integration has reduced the
representational qualities of European democracies by concentrating an increasing amount
of decisions in what is an executive dominated political system. 52. 53 Actions taken at this
European executive level are arguably beyond the control of national parliaments, as they
"a re llIuch 1lI0re isolated frolll national parliamentary scrutiny and control than are national
cabinet ministers or bureaucrats in the domestic policy-making process. As a result,
governments can effectively ignore their parliaments when making decisions in Brussels."54
On one hand, this study has made it apparent that permissive consensus allows elites to avoid
democratic consultation wllile the supranational decision-making process is taking place. At
the same time, however, the results align with Moravcsik's counterargument that the
E uropean Union has in fact m ade executives more accountable to their citizens. 55 One such
example of national parliaments keeping a check on the actions of their representative elites
occurred when the British Parliament's held Thatcher responsible not simply at home, but
also in a wider European context. It seems, therefore, that while there is little democratic
consultation , the actions taken at the European executive level are not necessarily beyond
the control of national parliam ents.
Wllile the EP is the only branch of the EU that is directl y elected , critics have
demonstrated that it is weak compared to the governments in the Council. 56 , 57, 58 Neither
national elections nor EP electio ns are 'European' elections: they are fought on domestic
rather than European issues, and parties collude to keep the issue of Europe off the domestic
age nda S9 ,60 The consequences are that EU citizens' preferen ces "on issues on the EU policy
age nda at best have only an indirect influence on EU policy outcomes."61 While, this study
confirms a lack of genuine 'European' elections, it also demonstrates that the public can
utilize elections as effective m eans by which to constrain the European policy decisions of
their national elites. As demonstrated in the 1989 EP elections in Germany, negative results
persuaded Kohl to take a different approach to EMU. Sinlilarly, the Conservative Party's loss
in the 1989 British EP elections demonstrated public disapproval with Thatcher's European
policy. While these electio ns did no t directly result in a change of her policy, they marked
the beginning of her downfall as Prime Minister. It can b e argued, thus, that the indirect
influence of elections is very real, regardless of their lacking a European focus. At the sam e
time, however, this indirect influence confirms the EPs inability to directly act as a legitimate
democratic institution.
Further claims of democratic deficit show that the European Union is either too far
removed from electoral controls, or too complex for citizens of the 11lember states to
understand and form reasoned opinions about. 62 According to such arguments, the EU has
alienated European citizens with serious repercussions for both the traditional democratic
ideal of a citizenry educated in the governmental process, and the ideal of government
actors accountable to the general public. Moravcsik counters this argument by clainling that
the EU policy-making process is more transparent than most domestic systems of
government.63 While the results of this study do not directly address this aspect of the
democratic deficit, they do in many ways confirm the detrimental consequences of this
problem. For example, low EP election turnout can be attributed to the indifference of
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voters towards European issues, indirectly compounding their already lacking democratic
nature. Furthermore, voter alienation m ay acco unt for the persuadability of the European
public, the consequences of which can be seen in France's M aastricht referendum, whereby
the decisions of Mitterrand, who had eqjoyed one of the largest European policy approval
ratings in Europe, was nearl y vetoed at the last moment by those opposed to ratification.
Thus, it can be seen that by distan cing itself from E uropean citizens, the EU has threatened
the traditional democratic ideal of citizenry educated in the governmental process.
Finally, the results of this study substantiate the claim that policies decided upo n at the
E uropean level are no t representative European voter preferences. In the m ajori ty of cases
studied in this paper, it ca n be seen that the public did not suppo rt th e European policies
decided on by their elite representatives. In some cases, these decisions were amended so as
to represent the interests of the public. In o thers they were not. T his raises an impo rtant
question : In such a vast and complex system , can the interests and preferences of every
individu al actor be reconciled? At the m om ent, the answer seem s to b e a definitive no. For
now, it appears that policies in the EU will must come abo ut as a result of comprOlnises
b etween interest parties from all the M embers States and all the main party o ppositions.64
Implicatiolls for the Future. The evidence against Inte rgove rnm entalism and
Supranationalsm should not be taken to m ean that these theories are absolutely right or
wrong, but rather, that we're dealing with a very complex political system. T he true value
for political scientists lies in identifying subtle ways tlut these m odels ca n help us interpret
the evide nce, and how the evidence helps us reinterpret them.
M o re importantly, this study has demonstrated that European executives have becom e
m ore accountable for their European policies, and that national pressures are capable of
indirectly influencing policy decisions at the European level. At the same time however, it
seems that the link between natio nal politics and EU level politics is considerably weak.
While the directly elected EP does attempt to reconcile this problem , it does not do so
effectively. To ensure that the dem ocratic nature of the EU is improved, further research
must b e done to advance our understanding of the true nature of the 'dem ocratic deficit' .
While tllis study has contributed som e valuable knowledge to theories ofEU politics
and the democratic defi cit debate, it does not necessarily paint an accurate picture of the
European Union today. Because it is difficult to gather evidence regarding the inner
workings of the EU until many years after the fact , this study focused on the period of EMU
development between 1989 and 1993. Since then, many changes have been made. Thus this
study should serve as a work that future researchers can refer back to when attempting to
m easure the successes and gains of the European Unio n as an ever increasingly successful
democratic institutio n.
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